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PRESID~~NT 'rRUMAN'S
PERSONALITY AND LEADERSHIP

The New \'ork Times eulogized him as a "decisive
pl'esident." 1 The compliment was well-deserved. Harry
Truman made more than his share of major decisions
while presiding over the nation as its 33rd president.
The atomic bomb, the Soviet intervention in the affairs
of Greece and Turkey, and the communist invasion of
South Korea were only a few of the developments that
required pr'ompt decisions with far-reaching consequences. Sometimes Truman embroiled himself in controversy unnecessarily. He did not have to dismiss
Gene"'ll MacArthur or seize the steel mills. But he
never hesitated to make these decisions and others like
them when he felt they were necessary. Handling so
many decisions is an accomplishment in itself.
The seven and a half years of Truman's administration were anything but uneventful; the President faced one problem aftel' another in rapid succession. Two of his decisions, the bomb and the Marshall
Plan, literally meant the difference between life and
death for thousands of people. Many men would have
broken under the strain. nut Truman did not b.·eak,
nor did he push his problems aside. He faced them
with courage and determination, aged very little while
in office, and lived longer (to age 88) than any other
president who served more than four years.2
It is no accident that Harry Tl"Uman bOI'e the
burden of the presidency so well. His psychological

l"Harry

s.. Truman: Decisive President," N!:.YLYj)[~n!JH~li, 27

December 1972, p. 42.
2,)ohn Adams and Hprbert Hoover, each of whom served one
terlll of fOllr years, both lived to the age of 90.
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makeup, reflected in his personality and style, help
explain both why he made the decisions he did, and
how he was able t.o deal with the effects of those
decisions without letting the pressure take years off
his life. A look at Truman's personal characteristics
and some of the major decisions he made will show
that his personality (how he perceived things) and
style (how he did things) enabled him to make numerous major decisions, some of them highly controvel'sial,
and to deal effectively with the slt'ess of his presidency.
Truman had no qualms about making decisions and
accepting full responsibility for thein. He felt this was
the only way he could ever be numbered among the
successful presidents. He told Merle Miller, one of his
biographers,
There's always a lot of talk about how we have to fear ...
a strong man, bllt ... if I read my American history right,
it isn't the strong men that have caused us most of the
trouble, it's the ones who were weak ... the ones who Just
sat on their asses and twiddled thell' thumbs when they were
Pres ide n t. 3

Decision making was more than a responsibility to
Harry Truman; it was the key to effective government.
President Truman took a common-sense approach
to making decisions. He said he always consulted with
his Cabinet on major policy decisions because he considered it "much better having pooled brains on impor'tant subjects than trying to have one head do the

3Merle Miller, flain_Sueakin~; An Oral BioJ:filVhy of Ihmy
S.Truman (New York: Berkely Publisillng Corporation, W74l, p.
375.
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work. ,,4 He learned to listen to both sides of an ar·
gument, thing about it, and then come to a decision. 5
According to Merle Miller, the President "asked his
associates to tell him how long he had to decide whatever was to be decided, and when the deadline came,
the decision had been made."u For him, it was as
simple as that.
Coupled with Truman's ability to m ..tke a decision
was his willingness to make an unpopular one. He
seldom worried about how his statements and actions
would affect his popularity. "He spoke his mind, reckless of the consequences fot· himself. ,,7 He felt this
was the only way he could properly exercise his role
in American government. "If you keep your mouth
shut about things you think are important," he said, "I
don't see how you can expect the democratic system to
work at all. ,,8 He wrote in his memoirs: "If a President is easily influenced ..lIld interested in keeping in
line with the press ;1nd the polls, he is a complete

4William Hillman, Mr. Pre::iIUellt (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and YOllng, 1fl52l, p. 18.

5.L"Jley Dunovan, ed., "The Wodd of Harry Tl"Uman," Tillle,
8 ,/anIHIl·y 1973, p. 17.

UMerle Miller, elm!! SJ.1eilkilu,:.~~n QmLBiQ~til12bYJll Harry
S.TrU!Ilil!l (New York: Berkley PulJlislul\g Corporation, 1974), p.
1:1.

7 Peter McG.·ath, et ;d., "The Trlllllan Centennial," J'.Ill.wsw.eek
1-1 May 1984,-». 2(i.

8Miller, p.1 :11·:12.
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wa!ihout. II!) Truman exemplified this principle by firing
General MacArthur. [t was more than a controversy;
it was one of the most unpopular decisions ever made
by an American president.
_
Standing up fot· his principles in the face of
political'danger was not a quality Truman acquired in
the White House; it had been ingrained in his character
throughout his political career. As a country judge
seeking reelection in U)24, he attended a meeting of
the Ku Klux Klan, not to identify himself with the
organization, but to tell them ofr. He called them "a
bunch of cheap, un-Ame.-ican fakers" 10 and told them
to "go to hell." II After he had his say, he walked
through the crowd and left.12 Courageous an act as it
was, it did not help him on Election Day. The Klan
had significant political influence at that time, ami
when the votes were in, Truman was out, defeated in
part by his own determination to say what he thought
needed to be said.
Part of the reason Truman could take an unpopular stand was that he did not fear criticism. He saw
criticism as a healthy part of the democratic process.
According to Political Scientist James David Barber,
Truman was able to leal'll from negative feedback because he could "separate the moral castigations from

9 Hnrry S. Truman, Y~!UIi Qf Trinl llI1dJIQIlil, 2 vols. (New
York: New American Library, I!Jf)(i), 2:229.
IOMargnret Tt'uman,
Books,

1~)74),

p. 74.

IIMiller, p. 74.
12 Ibid., p. I J 1.

Hllrry

S. TLUmiAn (New York: Pocket
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the substance of the arguments he received." 13 It did
not bother him when ordinary citizens were critical of
him and his administration. In 1951 he said: "If the
people couldn't blow off steam they might explode.
Half the fun of being a citizen in this country comes
from complaining about the way we run our government ... ,,14
One of Harry Truman's more enviable qualities
was that once he made a decision, he never worried
about it. Former President Lyndon ,Johnson observed
that
the great thing about Truman is that once he makes lip his
mind about something--anything, including the A Bomb··he
never looks back and asks, "Should I have done it? ... " he
just knows he made up his mind as best he could and that's
that. There's no going back. 15

Merle Miller added that there were "no regrets, no
looking back, no wondering if-I-had-to-do-it-all-overagain, would I have?" 16 Truman himself explained,
"Worrying never does you any good. So I've never
worried about things much. The only thing that I ever
do worry about is to be sure that where I'm respon13.rames Da vid Barber ,:nl',cPr~id@iialCh<lJ-<!Cter;Pr~dictjD~
&X(QrrrlanJ:JLiJLt.heWhJtlLHQJ.I£e, 2d ed. (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, (977), p. 277.
14Mark Goodman, ed., GiYL\~IIL1:iclLJ:lru:rxl (New York:
Universal Award House, (974), p. 162.
15Doris - Kearns, LyndQnJQ!lIJ£QIL,~LLh!LAmeri.can_Q.r~ill!l
(New York: New American Library, (976), p. 365.
16Miller, p. 13.
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sible. . the job is properly done." 17 Dean Acheson,
Truman's Secretary of State, wrote that his chief was
totally without what he called, "that most enfeebling of
emotions, regret." 18
One of Truman's more questionable attributes was
that he often saw things in simple terms. This made
it easier to make hard decisions, but it led him to
make some ill-fated decisions and created other problems. For example, he failed to understand his opponents' points of view and therefore could not see
the reason behind the opposition to his national health
insurance proposal. He wrote in his memoirs that he
was "never able to understand all the fuss some people
make about government wanting to do something to
improve and protect the health of the people." 19 Many
would naturally wonder whether the federalgovernment
was the answer to health concerns or whether it could
even afford to finance a national health insurance
program. But all Truman could see was that Americans, especially the elderly, who needed health care
and could not afford it, should be able to get it. He
had strongly defined values, and all too often he saw
things as either right or wrong, good or bad, with
nothing in between.
He tended to judge people the same way. Robert
J. Donovan, a former White House correspondent, wrote
that "Truman was a man who saw things in very strong
hues. He saw blacks and whiLes; he didn't see grays.

17 Ibid., p. 33.
18 Ibid ., p. 14.

19Truman, Years of Trial, 2::3 I.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN

91

.. 20 The book Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of'
Harry S. Truman, based on a series of interviews between Truman and Merle Miller, confirms this analysis.
An example of Truman's strongly defined values is the
way he viewed two American generals, George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. He liked Marshall
and could not say enough for him. Of Marshall not
receiving a parade like other World War II generals,
Truman said that "he deserved it more than all the
rest put together. I gave him a decoration or two, but
there wasn't a decoration anywhere that would have
been big enough for General Marshall. .. 21 From Tmman's perspective, it was almost as if Marshall had
never made a mistake in his life. As for Eisenhower,
Truman did not like him at all and found it difficult to
give him credit for much of anything. After Eisenhower warned the American people about the Pentagon's growing power in peacetime, Truman shared the
concern but refused to praise the president-general for
the speech. He concluded that "somebody must have
written it for him, and I'm not sure he understood
what he was saying ..... 22 Truman was blind to the
weaknesses of those he liked and blind to the
strengths of those he disliked. His lack of objectivity
was perhaps his most serious character fault.
[nsummary, HarryTrumanwasaninterestingman
because he possessed an interesting combination of
positive and negative qualities. He was direct and
decisive, with a sensible approach to problem-solving.
He had the courage to make unpopular decisions, and

20

.
McGrath et aI., p. 27.

21Miller, p. 250.
22 Ibid., p. 180.
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he was never intimidated by criticism. He did not fret
over past decisions; once made, there were no regrets.
On the other hand, he tended to see things in black
and white, which led to some oversimplifications in his
thinking. He had a hard time being objective about
issues and people.
All these characteristics at one time or another
played a significant role in major decisions Truman
made while serving as President of the United States.
At least one of the above-mentioned attributes was
partly responsible for each of his decisions regarding
the atom bomb, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, Point Four, Korea, the firing of General MacArthur, and the seizure of the steel mills.
President Truman had hardly taken office upon
the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt when he was called
upon to make the first and biggest of these decisions:
whether to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. He had
been President only three months when an atomic bomb
was successfully tested in New Mexico on July 16,
1945. Now he had to decide whether to drop on over
Japan in an effort to end World War II.
Truman had appointed an interim committee that
recommended the use of the bomb over invasion of
Japan with two million men as the administration had
planned. After the July 16th test, he promptly consulted with War Secretary Henry Stimson, Generals
Marshall and Eisenhower, and others. Most of them
favored using the bomb. General Marshall told him
that if the bomb worked it would save 250,000 Americans and perhaps millions of Japanese. 23
Truman opted to drop two atomic bombs on Japan.
He said this decision was the hardest one he ever

23William Hillman, Mr President (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Young, 1952), p. 248.
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made and that he only made it after "long and prayerful consideration,"24 but he wrote in his memoirs that
he never doubted the bomb should be used. 25
A B-29 bomber dropped the first atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945. More than 92,000
people were killed or missing; an equal number were
injured. More than four and a half of the city's
square miles were destroyed. The second bomb fell on
Nagasaki three days later and destroyed nearly two
square miles of land. At least 40,000 were killed or
missing;just as many were injured. Japan surrendered
five days later, and the war was over.
Two factors enabled Truman to make this decision
and live with it. One was his decisiveness, reflected
by his common-sense approach to problem-solving. Had
an invasion of Japan been necessary, half a million
soldiers on both sides would have been killed and a
million more "would hu ve been maimed for life. ,,26 The
bomb ended the war and saved lives. This consideration was all it took for Truman to feel he made the
right decision, despite the criticisms and questions that
would surface luter. 27 The other factor in his favor
was freedom from I·egret. He never looked back with
second though ts. 28
24T .S . Settel, ed., TheQuo.taWe~~l.I:l1llli1ll (New York:
Rerkley Publishing Corporation, 1967), p. 33.
25Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, 2 vols. (New York:
New American Library, 1955), 1:462.
26MiIler; p. 244.

27 lbid .
28 Ihid ., p.

15.
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After the war, the enormous task of rebuilding
Europe remained. Secretary of State George Marshall
suggested that the United States take the lead in
pI"omoting the recovery, and his recommendation, officially called the European Recovery Plan, became
known as the Marshall Plan. Truman said it was designed "purely for postwar rehabilitation in the countries of western Europe whose production and economy
were ruined by the war."29 According to reports he
received, Europe needed help. People were starving,
and food riots broke out in France and Italy. The
winter of' 1946-47 was unusually cold, and to add to
the food and coal shortages, tuberculosis became a
problem. 30 Truman believed the Marshall Plan was
vital to help Europeans "get back on their feet, "a I and
he pushed for its congressional support.
Congress approved the Marshall Plan, which
proved to he highly successful. Between L948 and
1952, sixteen countries in Europe received $1 :1.15 billion in aid that included food, machinery, and other
products. The real GNP of those countries rose by 25
percent, with a 35 percent increase in industrial production. The increases in chemicals, engineering, and
steel industries were even more significant. Winston
Churchill called the Marshall Plan "the most unsordid
act in history. ,,32 Even Richard Nixon, a political
enemy of Truman's, admitted that it "was successful in
every way: it saved Europe from starvation, it ensured

29Truman, Y!l.ars..!!LTrial, 2:268.
30Miller, pp. 257-58.
31 Ibid ., p. 257.
32 lbid ., p. 249.
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~~urope's economic recover'y, and it preserved Europe
from communism."33
Truman's tendency to see things in black and
white worked to his benefit when it helped him decide
to support the Marshall Plan. Although it was extremely expensive, Truman knew that countless Europeans needed food as well as protection from communism. They has to get the aid, regardless of cost,
so the Marshall Plan was implemented. It became one
of the crowning achievements of Truman's administration.
Other problems developed in Europe, particularly
in Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union demanded,
among other things, the right to set up air and naval
bases in Turkey. [n Greece, Soviet Premier .Joseph
Stalin supplied arms and ammunition to a guerilla army
of 20,000 men that tht'eatened to overthrow the existing government.:l 4

For about six weeks Truman struggled with what
he called a "terrible decision. ,,:l5 [f the U.S. supplied
aid to Greece and Tut'key, its action was certain to
increase tensions with the Soviet Union. Also, the
fact that Greece and Turkey had corrupt governments
would embarrass the Truman Administration. 36 But if

3:lRichnrtJ Nixon, Th~ MemQir~oLRkh;.!.[d Nixoll, 2 vols.
(New York: Warner Books, 1978), 1:62.
:l4Margal'et 1'rlllll<l!I, HarrY-S,--Tuuna.n (New York: Pocket
Books, (974), p. :l7H.
:l5Mnrgilret Truman, Lette!:lLfrQIIl Futher (New York: Pin.
Iwcle Books, W811, I). 90.

of

:l6Rohert H. Farrell, ed., illf the. Rel:onL The. frtyu.te.£auers
Harry S. Trumall (New York: Harper & How, W80), pp. 105-0H.
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the U.S. did nothing, these two nations would likely
succumb to communism.:n
As mistrust between the United States and the
Soviet Union intensified, an anonymous articJe appeared
in the journal Foreign Affairs that had a significant
impact on American fOl'eign policy. George F. Kennan,
a civilian diplomat in the American embassy at Moscow, gained wide publicity for the article which he
signed "X." Kennan used the article to share his philosophy on containment.
He argued that Soviet
insecurities would lead to an activist and possible
hostile Soviet foreign policy. He also stated that the
United States could increase the strains on Soviet
leadership in a way that would produce "either the
break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. ,,:18
Kennan took a stand on how Ame/'ican policy towards
the Soviets should be conducted, saying "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any
United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be
that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant
containment of Russian expansive tendencies. ,,39 His
viewpoint gained widespread attention and acceptance,
and signaled the birth of containment policy in the
United States. 40
Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf of the Uni-

:nTruman, IiLlrrY-S..-Trum<!n, p. 376.
38 X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," F.lHei~n _8ITiJirs 25
(.July 1947):582.
39 lbid ., p. 575.

40Charles W. Kegley, .11'. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, WQrld
2d ed. (New York: St. Mar·
tin's Press, 1985), pp. 51·52.
PQHlli;~l'.rend_!!ndj'ransfQrma.tiQn,
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versities of South Carolina and Florida, respectively,
argued that Kennan's pointofview influenced Truman's
foreign policy. They wrote: "It was not long before
this intellectual assessment received such wide publicity
that Truman made it the cornerstone of American
postwar policy. ,,41 Whether Truman was l"ightor wrong,
he did show a willingness to listen and learn from
others, an important element in his decision-making
habits.
President Truman addressed a joint session of
Congress on March 12, 1947 to outline his policy. He
asked for $400 million in aid to strengthen Greece
against Communist-led revolutions and to help Turkey
resist Soviet pressure. He announced "that it must be
the policy of the United States to support free people
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities 01' by outside pressures. ,,42 This policy,
which became known as the Truman Doctrine, marked
the beginning of an overt American effort to contain
Communist expansion. It was the first time the United
States had ever committed military aid overseas in
peacetime. A new era in American foreign policy was
underway.
Truman had a hard time with this decision, but it
would have been even more difficult for him were it
not for his decisive approach to problem-solving and
his simplistic view of the situation. Barton Bernstein,
an author critical of the Truman Doctrine, gave useful
insights into the President's reasoning.
He said
Truman believed that a communist victory in Greece
would probably lead to communist victories in othet'
European nations and that the spread of communism

41 lbid .
42Truman, Years of Trial, 2: 129.
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would undermine world peace and thus threaten the
security of the United States. 43 This logic, bmken
down into simple terms, made it easier for Truman to
formulate his policy, which helped save Greece and
Turkey fmm communist takeovers.
Truman also made major decisions in his second
term. When he was sworn into the presidency on
January 20, 1949, he proposed "a bold new program for
making the benefits of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available fol' the improvement and
growth of underdeveloped areas. ,,44 This policy became
known as Point Four because it was the fourth point
in his inaugural address. It was designed to use American skills, knowledge, equipment, and investmentcapital to help developing nations in such al'eas as industry, agriculture, and education. Truman said the
program was not designed to be a government handout
but to "help people to help themselves, with the theory
that prosperity of all parts of the world means the
prosperity of the whole world. ,,45 Reporter William
Hillman wrote that President Truman considered "his
Point Four Program the most important peace policy
development of his administration. ,,46
Point Four won congressional approval on June 5,

43Balton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the
Origins of the Cold War," In e.olitk:umd P\llicje~ \If the Truman
Adminill1WUQu, p. 15-77, Edited by Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 55.
44Truman, YtlliU1L'Irial, 2:267.
45William Hillman, ML.rres..ident<New York: Farral',Stl'Uus,
and Young, 1952), pp. 249-50.
46 lbid ., p. 249.
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1950, and it grew rapidly. [n a little over a decade,
6,000 American technicians were working in 58 nations
helping the natives.
Truman used a common-sense approach that enable him to make a decision in favor of Point Four.
The inhabitants of many countries suffered a low standard of living even though those countries had immense natural resources. Since the people obviously
did not know how to use those resources to their best
advantage, Truman found it easy to be decisive in
sending American technicians to teach them.
[f President Truman thought the end of World
War [J would end his administration's involvement in
over'seas fighting, he was sadly mistaken. After the
Second World War', the Soviets exercised considerable
influence in North Korea. They established a communist puppet government there, organized an ar'my of
Koreans, and militarized the 38th parallel line. North
Koreans also created problems for South Koreans with
their program of propaganda, subversion, and terrol'ism.
It was only a matter of time before they would clash
in warfare.
The clash came on June 25, 1950. Claiming they
had to repel an invasion of South Koreans, North
Koreans crossed the border into South Korea and headed to Seoul, its capital city. South Koreans, caught by
surprise with their forces dispersed, offer'ed little effective r'esistance to the advancing troops.
President Truman was relaxing in his home in
Independence, Missouri when he received word of the
invasion. At his urging, the U.N. Security Council
adopted a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding an end to the fighting. This was made possible by the absence of Soviet delegates, who were
involved in a temporary boycott of the U.N. On June
27, Truman authorized the lise of air and naval forces
to help the South Koreans. Three days later, he ex-
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tended this aid to include American ground forces. So
began American involvement in an undeclared war that
lasted three years and cost thousands of American
lives.
Peter McGrath and his associates, in an article
for Newsweek magazine, wrote that Truman's habit of
seeing things in black and white led to his decision to
commit troops to Korea. 47 According to Merle Miller,
Truman's attitude about the North Koreans was that
"we've got to stop the sons of bitches no matter what
.. .',48 Truman's daughter wrote that he thought the
invasion would lead to World Wat· ([1,49 and he undoubtedly felt a need to help South Korea in order to
prevent such a war-.
Senator Robert Taft, the Republican majority
leader, recommended ajoint congressional resolution to
authorize intervention in Korea. Truman ignored the
suggestion and committed troops on his own. Historian
ArthUl' Schlesinger wrote that this was Truman's "great
mistake," and that by disagreeing with Senator Taft
the President "created the precedent of inherent presidential power to send troops into combat. ,,50 In this
case, Truman's tendency to see things in black and
white led to a serious blunder. Because he felt that
the important thing was to stop the North Koreans,
and since he regarded the Commander-in- Chief clause
of the Constitution as authority enough to intervene,
he increased presidential power in a way that has since

47 McGrath, p. 27.
48Miller, p. 285.

49Truman, Harr~S..Truman, p. 495.
50McGrath, p. 27.
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haunted the American people.
Anothe.· major decision Truman made regarding
the Korean conflict is less controversial today than it
was at the time. Douglas MacArthu.·, a popular general
who led the American t.·oops in Korea, often disagreed
with the President on how the war should be conducted. When Tmman had finally had enough, he fired
the geneml for insubordination.
The trouble between these leaders started after
communist China got involved in the war. U.N. forces
recaptured most of South Korea and pmceeded north
to the Yalu River, the border sepa.·ating North Korea
and China. MacArthur had received permission to
destroy military forces in North Korea. Truman also
let him proceed to the Yalu based on the assumnce the
general had given him that China would not attack.
But China did attack. Chinese soldiers not only .·outed
MacArthur's forces but drove them back across the
:18th parallel.
MacArthur now felt that China should be fought
as well as North Korea. He wanted to bomb supply
centers in Manchuria and unleash Chinese nationalists
in Taiwan to help fight the communist mainland. The
President, however, stood firm in his determination to
prevent World War III. The disagreement lasted for
months.
The final showdown came in March 1951, when
MacArthur and his men reached the 38th parallel. The
President wanted him to stop there and hopefully negotiate a cease-fire, but MacArthur publicly disagreed,
saying that only expansion of the war could lead to
lasting peace. He proposed blockading China's coast,
bombing its industrial cities, and using Chain Kai-shek's forces in Taiwan to invade South China. After
that statement, the President knew the general had to
go.
The last straw broke on April 5 when MacAr-
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thur's letter to Representative .Joseph W. Martin, expressing his disagreement with the policies of the
administration, was read in Congress. Truman fired
him six days later. In the official announcement prepared for reporters, the President stated:
With deep regret, I have concluded that General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support
to the policies of the United States Government and of the
United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties
.. _ I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his
commands and ha vedesignated Lieu tenan tGeneral Matthew B.
RIdgway as his successor. 51

The dismissal aroused a storm of cl"iticism through
the United States. According to the Gallup Poll, only
29 percent of the American people supported the President's decision. 52 Less than 5 percent of the letters
and telegrams that poured into the White House favored the dismissal. 53 Some Senators who supported the
President said that telegrams from their constituents
were running "ten to one" against him. 54 Most newspapers condemned the action. 55 When Truman entered
Griffith Stadium in Washington, D.C. to watch a base-

51Truman, Years of Trial, 2:509.
52Miller, p. 333.
53 lbid .
54"G.O.p. Hits Ouster: Republicans in Congress Raise Threat
of Step to Impeach Truman," NeW-Y!.lr~l'imes, 12 April 1951, p.
3.

55Miller, p. 333.
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ball game, he was booed by the fans. When he left,
he was booed again, and a few shouted, "Where's MacAl'thul'?,,56 There was talk of impeachment on Capitol
HiII.57 The President was also "burned in effigy in
numerous towns, and even on a few college campuses.
Something very close to mass hysteria gripped the
nation.,,58
In this day and age of persistent poll-watching, it
is difficult to imagine a politician making a decision
that he knew would spark such an uproar. But Truman
was able to make such a decision because he had the
courage to do what he felt was right at the cost of
severe criticism. Letting the beloved general go was
unque::;tionably the most unpopular decision he ever
made, and his character empowered him to make it.
Truman's simplistic analysis of the situation also
helped. "He disobeyed orders, and I was Commanderin-Chief, ... So I acted as Commander-in-Chief and
called him home. ,,59
Not all of President Truman's problems were
related to foreign affait·s. Labor problems were among
the domestic issues that faced his administration.
Strikes were a constant threat, and Truman often lost
his patience with labor leaders. When U,S. steelworkers went on strike in 1952, he ordered the federal
government to seize and operate the steel mills.
The Wage Stabilization Board had recommended a
56"Boos and Blows," l"i~ws.weeJi, 30 April 1951, p. 22.
57 Miller, p. 335.
58Truman, Hurry:::LTrumi.l1l(New York: Pocket Books, 1974),
p.56;}.
59Miller, p. :135.
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raise of 26.4 cents an hour for the Steelworkers Union.
The company would not bargain with the union and
would only gr-ant the raise on the condition they could
raise the price of steel by $12 a ton. 60 When an
agreement could not be reached, the United Steelworker's went on strike, and "the flow of steel to
Korean War annament manufacturers was effectively
stopped. ,,61
In the name of national security, President
Truman issued Executive Order 10:140, authorizing federal seizur'e of the steel mills. The next day he asked
Congress for authority to operate them. When Congress refused to act, the mills took their case to court.
Federal Judge David Pines held that Truman's order'
was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, in a 6-3
decision, upheld that ruling. 62
The steel companies got their mills back, and the
strike continued. It lasted a total of fifty-five days.
Total losses during that time were estimated to be $2.5
billion. 63
Truman had ordered government seizure of the
steel mills because he felt that victory in Korea could
depend on it. National security, he reasoned, depended
on defense production, which depended on steel. 64
Therefore, steel had to be produced even if the gov-

61David S. Thomson, Afut2riallH!llUaliliY.:.liS'I (New York:
Grosset & Dunlap. 1973), p. 85.
62Truman,

Harry S Truman, p. 583.

63Thompson, fut!ltiaLB~r;,H!hy, p. 85.
64Truman, Years of Trial, 2:534.
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ernmellt had to step in and produce it.
The COUl"ts did not accept this argument, and
neither did historians. [n his book The American
Presidency, Clinton Rossiter, who spoke highly of
Truman, condemned the steel seizure as one of his
"sins of commission. ,,65 A journal article in Economist,
written in tribute to Truman after his death, stated
that his "efforts to get tough with the unions when he
considered that strikes on the railways and in the steel
industry were endangering national security ended in
humiliating failure."G6
Truman's oversimplified perception that victory in
Korea depended on consistent steel production led him
to make a decision that would have been better left
unmade. Ordering the government to take ovel' the
steel mills was an extreme measure not justified by the
circumstances; the strike did not cause an American
collapse in Korea. Truman overestimated the seriousness of the problem and overreacted, producing an
embarrassing repudiation by the Supreme COUl·t that
could have been easily avoided. It was unfortunate
that a pl'esident who played such a large role in ending a world war and feeding a foreign continent could
not deal effectively with strikes at home.
[n conclusion, Harry Truman was a man or extraordinary strengths and forgivable weaknesses. He
was a president whose personality and style affected
decisions that in large me ..lsure would determine his
place in history. Some of those decisions, like the
Marshall Plan and Point Four, needed to be made.
65Clinttln Rossiter, Th~Ameliru!LeresidenO', rev. ed. (New
York: New American Library, 19(0), p. 148.
66"The Mall from Independence," E.!:.IHlQIni£t 245 (30 December 1972): 14.
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They improved the condition of the world and secured
Truman's status as an excellent president. Other decisions, like seizing the steel mills and lea ving Congress
out of the decision-making pl'Ocess that put ~merican
troops in Korea, were serious mistakes that needlessly
stained the presidency. The rightness or wrongness of
othel' decisions, such as committing troops to Korea in
the first place, is more debatable. But on the whole,
the country and the world were better off as a result
of HalTY Truman's leadership. (n the words of Arthur
Schlesinger: "Truman had to face major crises and he
handled them well--and without all the nonsense and
the pomp of subsequent presidents. ,,67 Truman no only
handled those problems well, but he did so in a way
that allowed him to preserve his health and live more
than nineteen years as a former president.
One of the most eloquent tributes to Truman's
service in the White House came from Richard Nixon,
who many years before had been one of Harry Truman's harshest critics. Nixon was President of the
United States when Truman died and issued a statement upon his passing that said, in part: "He did what
had to be done, when it had to be done, and because
he did the world today is a better and safer place--and
generations to come will be in his debt. ,,68

BLAKE EDWARD ADAMS

67McGrath, p. 27.
68"Nixon Leads Truman Tributes from U.S. and World
Leaders," New York Times, 27 Decemher 1972, p. 44.
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